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Introduction 
 
In this paper we outline the concept of therapeutic misconception (TM) and its implications 
for informed consent in the context of clinical trials for childhood diseases. Although TM has 
been well described (Miller and Joffe, 2006), it has not been considered in the context where 
parental consent is a requirement. In this situation, it is often the parent who is vulnerable to 
TM. Drawing upon our experience of translational research in rare diseases, we consider the 
wider environment in which the value of research is promoted as well as the particular 
circumstances of clinical trials. The information component of informed consent is significant 
for the research participant, yet little attention has been paid to the wider sources of 
information and influence that parents may draw upon when making their decision.  It is 
evident that in the rare disease context there is an important role played by the patient 
advocacy groups as sources of information, alongside clinicians and trial co-ordinators. There 
is no doubt that the influence of advocacy groups has been, and continues to be a positive one 
in terms of advancing the cause of people with rare, chronic, life-limiting disease.  However, 
we also recognise that TM may be embedded within the patient advocacy approach to the 
promotion of research to the extent that the treatment/research distinction becomes blurred. 
Balanced against this, we also  consider the opportunity such organizations present to 
overcome TM through a process of co-operation and collaboration between them and the 
researcher that goes some way towards ameliorating the challenges of ensuring that the risks 
as well as the benefits of research are explained adequately.  
  
  
 
Acknowledging the conflicting forces at play for patients, parents and researchers, we 
explore the role of hope, trust and scientific ambition as factors within the complex research 
context.  TM is regarded as highly relevant to the concept of a legally valid and ethical 
informed consent that is the necessary gateway to involvement in research.  The volumes of 
literature on consent (Faden and Beauchamp, 1986, Doyal and Tobias, 2000, and Manson and 
O’Neil, 2002) have already established the problematic nature of consent, yet it remains both 
central to, and necessary for ‘ethical’ research, as well as being a legal requirement as our 
focus on the UK position demonstrates by way of example.  We acknowledge that research 
which requires participants who are also patients with life-threatening conditions, presents 
particular challenges, even more so when those patients are children and require parental 
consent.  It is clear that in such circumstances consent processes can appear too fragile to 
withstand all of the ethical work they are required to do. Nevertheless, we conclude that 
consent should not be abandoned. 
 
The focus of this paper has been undertaken under the aegis of Translational Research 
in Europe – Assessment and Treatment of Neuromuscular Diseases (TREAT-NMD) which is 
a European Network of Excellence formed to advance diagnosis and care, and develop new 
treatments for neuromuscular disorders (NMDs) (TREAT-NMD, 2010).  There are over 60 
neuromuscular conditions, most of which do not have an effective treatment (Pohlschmidt 
and Meadowcroft, 2010).  In this paper we make particular reference to Duchenne Muscular 
Dystrophy (DMD) which is one of the most common genetic disorders affecting children and 
young adults with one in every 3,500 boys born worldwide affected.  DMD is a severe, 
progressive muscle-wasting condition which presents in early childhood and patients become 
wheelchair-dependent in their early teenage years. Without treatment, DMD causes death in 
the early twenties.  The social and emotional costs are considerable, and families report care 
  
 
burden and support issues, isolation, social inequality and psychological stress and 
depression (Gagliardi, 1991; Ahlstrom,and Sjoden, 1996; Abresch, Seyden et al, 1998; 
Eggers and Zatz, 1998; Natterlundand Sjoden et al, 2001; Bothwel, Dooley et al, 2002; 
Bostrom and Ahlstrom, 2004; Boyer, Drame et al, 2006 and Gibson, Young et al. 2007). 
There is now a well-established international network of patient organizations that are well-
informed, experienced lobbyists and effective fundraisers.  These organizations have been 
pressing for research leading to treatment for neuromuscular diseases and have entered into 
partnerships with researchers and clinicians.  There are several compounds entering clinical 
trials for DMD, but these are still a very early step in the translational process from 
laboratory to clinic.  It is in this context of the promise of an actual therapy for DMD, that 
concern about TM has been raised. 
 
Addressing the issue of parental consent to research is both important and timely 
because the European Commission is keen to address the lack of research into drugs used to 
treat children (Sammons 2009).  The dearth of research involving children is ethically 
untenable because they cannot be assumed to be receptive to adult drug formulations 
(Stephenson, 2005). Although 10 – 20 per cent of drugs prescribed for children in general 
practice are unlicensed for use in children, this figure rises to 45 percent on general paediatric 
wards and to over 90 per cent in neonatal intensive care (Parliamentary Office of Science and 
Technology, 2006). For children with DMD the situation is even worse and the population is 
reliant upon innovation specifically targeted at their condition.  There is now European 
legislation encouraging drug companies to undertake appropriate research for childhood 
conditions so that their therapeutic needs are more directly addressed (for example, 
Regulation 1901, 2006, Regulation 1768, 1992, Directive 2001/20/EC and Directive 
2001/83/EC). The legislation will increase information available to the patient/carer and 
  
 
prescriber about the use of medicines in children, including clinical trial data.  These 
objectives will be achieved through a system of requirements and incentives, overseen by the 
Paediatric Committee sited at the European Medicines Agency (EMA). These paediatric-
specific provisions work alongside the framework that regulates the use of modern, 
biotechnological medicinal products. For example, Regulation 726/2004 established the 
EMA responsible for the authorization and supervision of medicinal products for human and 
veterinary use following scientific evaluation of the quality, safety and efficacy of the 
product. It creates a single European authorization process for the placing of advanced 
therapy medicinal products on the market and potentially allows faster and safer access to 
treatment for patients who suffer from diseases that have, until now, been incurable. This 
Regulation will cover new forms of treatment including advanced therapy medicinal 
products, such as gene therapy, somatic cell therapy and tissue engineering. Articles 6(7), 
9(4) and 0(6) of Directive 2001/20/EC deal with clinical trials relating to these therapies. 
These initiatives are likely to have a major impact on the biotechnology and medical research 
industries, and will play a large part in determining the direction that European medical 
research takes in the future.  
 
The European legislation also presents an opportunity to exclude unethical therapies 
from the marketplace: the EMA market authorization will only be granted if the product 
satisfies scientific evaluation of quality, safety and efficacy of the product. It will also have to 
reach the high ethical standards of the Clinical Trials Directive (Directive 2001/20/EC) at its 
clinical trial stage. There will be a need for rules to be developed to ensure good clinical 
practice in investigations involving advanced therapy medicinal products because of their 
specific technical characteristics (ibid. and Article 4(2)). Thus, from a regulatory perspective, 
the process of bringing new drugs to the market will be rigorous. This system of governance 
  
 
should ensure that participants in research are not subjected to undue risk. However, in our 
view, the level of risk involved is independent of the fact that consent ought to be voluntary 
and informed. Since it is likely that rare diseases will be the subject of advanced therapies 
research, then the challenge of explaining these experimental therapies will be all the greater. 
The precautionary tone regarding the inclusion of children in clinical trials (for example, 
para. 3) suggests to us that particular care is needed to ensure that parental consent 
procedures are rigorously managed. 
 
With this European legislative context in mind, the next section explores what is 
meant by TM. 
 
What is TM? 
 
The phenomenon that participants in clinical research often have a poor understanding of the 
purpose of the research has been thoroughly explored elsewhere (Kodish et al, 2004 and 
Siminoff and Simon, 2004).  Appelbaum and colleagues were the first to consider the ethical 
implications of a particular form of misconception, the therapeutic misconception (TM), 
when they observed that patients with mental health disorders, involved in randomised 
clinical trails, believed that the trial drug was given with the same therapeutic intent as the 
other treatments provided by their doctor (Appelbaum, Roth et al, 1982 and Appelbaum, Roth 
et al, 1987, Appelbaum, Lidz and Grisso, 2004 and Henderson et al, 2006).  This literature 
reveals that there are many misconceptions amongst research participants about the nature 
and purpose of research including the meaning of such terms as ‘randomisation’ and 
‘placebo’.  However, TM may be held independently of other misunderstandings about 
  
 
research.  For the purposes of further scrutiny of the phenomenon of TM, Henderson et al 
proposed the following definition: 
 
Therapeutic misconception exists when individuals do not understand that the defining purpose of 
clinical research is to produce generalizable knowledge, regardless of whether the subjects enrolled in the 
trial may potentially benefit from the intervention under study or from other aspects of the clinical trial. 
(Henderson et al, 2007, p. 1736) 
 
However, in line with the views expressed by the National Bioethics Advisory Commission 
(2001), we suggest that if trial participants, or those consenting for them, believe that the 
central purpose of the specific trial is therapeutic and that the individual subject will 
personally benefit from participation, then this false belief may motivate them to participate, 
and in extreme cases may disqualify their consent.  At first glance, the ethical import of TM 
lies in the significance it has for a person’s capacity for autonomy, including their ability to 
weigh the risks of participation in proportion to benefits.  If there is a false belief in the direct 
benefit of the research, then the implication is that less weight will be given to the risks of 
participation.  Before exploring the ethical implications in more detail we shall examine a 
number of factors that have a bearing upon the TM. 
 
Factors in Therapeutic Misconception 
 
The factors that foster TM are multiple, often subtle and complex.  One of the influential 
factors in the wider context is the way in which public perception of medical science is 
influenced by the public face of science.  A broad programme of research such as human 
embryonic stem cells (hESC) research is widely discussed and publicly ‘hyped’ in the media 
representations of the science (Williams-Jones and Corrigan, 2003, Horrobin, 2003,  and 
  
 
Braude et al, 2005, Geesink et al, 2008, Woods 2008). In addition, as Dresser observes, 
celebrity endorsement of stem cell science can be very influential (Dresser 2002).  
Christopher Reeve, the actor who suffered a spinal cord injury, was just such a prominent 
advocate of hESC science and, rightly or wrongly, was associated with a belief that stem cell 
science was close to delivering a cure (CRF, 2005).  A consequence of public misconceptions 
about the stage at which hESC is currently at, has been the growing unethical trade in so-
called ‘stem cell therapies’ (Sorapop and Douglas, 2009). Parents of patients with rare 
diseases such as DMD can be vulnerable to exaggerated claims and deliberate mis-selling of 
such technologies as established therapies. (TREAT-NMD Project Ethics Council, 2010) 
 
In the UK, the Department of Health’s publication, Stem cell research: medical 
progress with responsibility (DoH, 2000), was cautious but optimistic about the longer-term 
future of stem cell science, yet the major investment into stem cell science within the UK has 
led to  high expectations for short-term benefits (Braude et al, 2005).   Another source of 
elevated expectation stems from the competitive research funding environment which means 
that bids for funding have to be ‘pitched’ to funders, and the accompanying public message is 
often the same one of short-term benefit for specific diseases (Geesink et al, 2008). The 
families of patients, and patients with DMD, are particularly sensitive to any news of a 
possible therapy.  Patient organizations operate websites that constantly update members on 
news of clinical trials, promising compounds and any hopeful new development (Action 
Duchenne).  These same organizations often seek collaboration and support from 
pharmaceutical companies and academic researchers who are yet another source of 
information (Muscular Dystrophy Association, Parent Project Muscular Dystrophy). This is 
not to say that patient organizations are deliberately misrepresenting the stage of scientific 
development, but often information can be present information with an underlying hint of 
  
 
optimism easily identified by those with a disposition to hope in a biotechnological solution. 
Martin and Nightingale (2004) have argued that the promises of the so-called ‘biotech 
revolution’ are in general over-blown: ‘[m]any expectations are wildly optimistic and over-
estimate the speed and extent of the impact of biotechnology’ (p. 564). Information that aims 
to foster hope and aspiration can so often be misrepresented as fact, particularly when there is 
poor attention to the language in which these discussions take place.  Such is the faith 
invested in a solution through biotechnology that there is the potential for a ‘collective 
therapeutic misconception’ that fosters collusion in a highly optimistic belief in a bio-
technological solution (Dresser, 2001 and Dresser, 2002). 
 
Several commentators have also remarked upon the implicit collusion that can occur 
between the researcher and the research subject (Appelbaum et al, 1982, Dresser, 2002, de 
Melo-Martin and Ho, 2008).  There are several factors involved. One is related to the 
psychology or social conditioning of patients, or their parents, whose relationship with a 
clinician is framed by expectations for personal care (Joffe et al, 2001, Appelbaum et al, 
2004).  In the research context the physician who acts as a personal doctor providing care 
may also be working in a dual role as both physician and researcher but in circumstances in 
which the differences between those roles are not clearly understood by parents and patients 
(Bamberg and Budwig, 1992 and Hadskis et al, 2008).  As de Melo-Martin and Ho (2008) 
observe, trust is an essential element in an effective clinical relationship but is also necessary 
in the research relationship.  However, they argue that the grounds for trust differ between the 
clinical and the research context but that these grounds can become blurred when one person 
is playing a dual role.  Even though the physician in his or her capacity as researcher may act 
with integrity, the distinction between the roles of clinician and researcher is often too subtle 
for patients to appreciate, a situation that is not helped by the common practice of research 
  
 
being described in therapeutic terms such as when an experimental substance is described as 
a new ‘treatment’.   Henderson (2008) found that parents of DMD boys who had developed 
trust in their physician also turned to them for guidance when it came to making research 
decisions, often taking the physician’s outline of the research for which their child may be 
eligible as a recommendation to join the study rather than the description of the study. This 
echoes findings reported elsewhere (Dresser, 2002). Clinicians are also subject to similar 
psychological pressures because they are often deeply involved with the families they care 
for which may influence their capacity to separate their different roles as clinician and as 
researcher (Bamberg and Budwig, 1992 and Miller, 2000).  It can also be difficult for 
individuals to separate the emotional from the rational in a context in which they are also 
passionately involved in the issues. This may be as true for clinicians and researchers as it is 
for patients and parents (Reynolds and Nelson, 2007 and Dixon-Woods et al 2007).  We 
would suggest that there is therefore a need to carefully mark out the ‘informing’ procedure 
from the clinical consultation though clinicians often contend that they are the most 
appropriate person to discuss research with their own patients (Personal communication, 
Straub, 2010). We also appreciate that finding additional time in which to discuss research 
with patients can add pressure to a clinician’s already busy schedule.  
 
Having examined some of the key factors that can influence TM, the following 
section outlines the UK’s legal approach to informed consent with a view to setting out the 
legal and moral duties of the researcher as well as those of the parent where parental consent 
is required. The question then is how the notion of TM with respect to research should be 
addressed to avoid an infringement of the law. 
 
  
 
The Legal Framework in the UK 
 
As noted above, that there should be free and informed consent to any biomedical 
intervention as a condition of good clinical practice has widespread agreement in 
international codes of ethics, human rights instruments and, in some jurisdictions, domestic 
law. To take the UK example, the Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations 
2004 (Regulations 2004), which gave force to the EC Clinical Trials Directive, strengthen 
any claims made by a participant that this requirement has been breached (Schedule 1, Part 
3). The Regulations give rise to potential civil and criminal liability but do not demand the 
same level of detail as some professional guidance (for example, General Medical Council 
(GMC), 2002, paras. 19-21) and international instruments (for example, the Declaration of 
Helsinki, 2008, para. 22) to satisfy informed consent requirements. 
 
The Regulations require that a legal representative, unconnected with the trial, must 
give informed consent on an incapacitated person’s behalf (Schedule 1, Part 1, para. 2 
(incapacitated adults) and Schedule 1, Part 4 (children).   For children under 16, this will be 
someone with parental responsibility as provided by section 3(1) Children’s Act 1989 (CA).  
Provided children over 16 satisfy the requirements for competency under section 2(1) of the 
Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA), they will be able to consent for themselves and every 
possible means must be used to support the individual to make their own decisions (section 
1(3) and Code of Practice, Chapter 3). Where a proxy is unavailable or unwilling to act in this 
capacity, the participant’s doctor may act as the legal representative provided they are 
unconnected with the trial.  If this is not possible, the relevant NHS Trust may nominate 
someone else to act as the legal representative provided they, too, are unconnected with the 
trial.  
  
 
 
A parent or legal representative must act on the basis of the ‘presumed will’ of the 
incapacitated patient with all the inherent difficulties this concept entails, given that it may 
not be based on past or current expressed will (Schedule 1, Part 4, para. 13 (child) and 
Schedule 1, Part 5, para 13 (incapacitated adult). Although such devices may import a level 
of fiction into the calculation they are nevertheless an important indication of the extent the 
law is prepared to go to factor in a level of respect for self-determination. The interpretation 
of legal requirements will be subject to the rules of statutory interpretation and, where 
relevant, judicial decision-making through the common law. Ethical guidance will also be 
interpreted through the common law where necessary. Where the common law is engaged, 
the principles established in case law on medical treatment will need to be distilled and 
applied by analogy to the research context, given the paucity of directly relevant cases. 
Parents must act in their child’s best interests (Gillick, 127).  A wide reading is now given to 
best interests, which encompass medical, emotional and other welfare factors (Re A 2000, 
555), including the psychological and social benefits (Re Y, 1997, 562),  so this should 
include allowing children to influence what happens to them as much as possible (GMC, 
2007). It is arguable that all that a parent is required by the law to do is act in a way which is 
not against a child’s best interests (S v S, 1972).  Following that principle would give parents 
authority to consent to certain non-therapeutic interventions on their children (Pattinson, 
2011, p. 185).  In the event of a conflict, a court must decide what is in the child’s best 
interests (Glass, 1999) and regard must be had to the wishes and feelings of the child 
concerned as far as they can be ascertained according to their age and understanding (section 
1(3)(a) CA) but it has been argued that the courts are only too ready to deny children’s 
agency under the cloak of welfare discussions (James, 2008).   
 
  
 
A researcher may be liable to certain legal claims such as a claim in trespass to the 
person where consent to research procedures is judged invalid because of a failure to disclose 
sufficient information about an intervention. A valid consent requires that the person (or their 
proxy) is legally competent, their decision has been made free from coercion and that they are 
broadly aware of the proposed intervention (Chatterton, 1981). It is certainly conceivable that 
a researcher who encouraged TM may be considered as having breached the standard of 
reasonable disclosure. A research participant may also have a claim available in negligence 
where they have suffered harm (Sidaway, 1985) as a result of their participation in research. 
This is in addition to any action that arises under the Regulations or in trespass to the person 
where the basic requirements of a valid consent are not met. Actions in negligence are 
challenging for claimants and will only succeed if the doctor has breached the Bolam (1957) 
standard as to what a reasonable doctor would have disclosed in the same circumstances, 
subject to the Bolitho (1998) requirement that medical opinion should be capable of 
withstanding logical analysis.  Information should now be disclosed where there is a 
significant risk of harm that would affect the judgment of a reasonable, prudent patient 
(Pearce, 1999).  It is likely that there would be liability in battery and negligence if the 
researcher failed to disclose the intervention was experimental or mainly for research 
purposes. The courts have exhibited a growing tendency in favour of patient’s rights to 
information (Chester 2005).  In addition, doctors cannot rely on their ‘therapeutic privilege’ 
(Sidaway, 1985) to decide it would not be in a patient’s best interests to be made aware of 
research information. In deciding the appropriate standard of disclosure, courts are likely to 
take account of national and international guidance and these are very clear on the need for 
detailed disclosure. In practice, the information provided for research participants undergoes 
several rounds of scrutiny not least of which by the Research Ethics Committee (REC). 
Researchers are also encouraged to involve patients at an early stage in the development of 
  
 
the research protocol and to take advantage of patient scrutiny of the information materials 
under development. A prudent researcher who has consulted and taken advice at various 
stages in developing information for participants would be less vulnerable to the scrutiny of 
the courts.   
 
Notwithstanding this trend, difficulties remain in the research context. These include 
ascertaining what was known about risks at the time the research was conducted and the 
degree of latitude allowed to health professionals on disclosure by the Bolam standard even 
with the Bolitho caveat.  Establishing the causal link between the undisclosed risks and the 
eventuating damage is always problematic. Proving the research subject would have opted 
not to participate had they been aware of the risks is also difficult notwithstanding the 
decision in Chester.  Overall, there is widespread agreement that in the case of non-
therapeutic treatment, the level of disclosure should be much higher than that expected with 
respect to treatment. For example, in the US, the failure to disclose risks has even been held 
to violate the fundamental right to life and liberty under the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution (Re Cincinnati Radiation 1995).  
 
Of course, all relevant information pertaining to a study needs to be understood by the 
participant or their representative, and the GMC’s guidance is particularly helpful in this 
regard (GMC, 2002).  It stipulates that the information that the patient wants or, importantly, 
‘ought to know’, should be ‘presented in terms and a form that they can understand’ with 
detailed guidance as what this might be, including allowing for time to deliberate on the 
implications of participating in research (paras. 19-21).  The guidance is also useful in that it 
stipulates that doctors must not put pressure on volunteers to participate in research and must 
ensure that no real or implied coercion is put on those in a dependant relationship (ibid.). This 
  
 
approach is echoed in its Good Practice in Research (2010). The GMC has now published 
specific guidance on ways in which communication with children may be enhanced (GMC, 
2007).  It must not be forgotten that professional guidance provides a useful benchmark for 
the courts to consider in any allegation of breach, and referral to the GMC is an option for the 
aggrieved who cannot or do not wish to pursue litigation.  Breach of this guidance may result 
in disciplinary action. Following the GMC guidance seems to us to be an example of making 
reasonable endeavours in seeking informed consent. A court is unlikely to ask for more. Of 
course, notwithstanding these efforts, TM may still be operating. 
 
Although there has been some consideration of the circumstances in which those who 
lack the mental capacity to consent may be included in a clinical trial by the proxy consent of 
their legal representative, perhaps the least controversial of these proxies remains the parental 
consent for a child. Even here there are concerns because many regard children as the most 
vulnerable research participants and therefore the level of protection required by society is 
greatest. While a cautious approach is entirely appropriate, especially when we consider that 
unethical research has been undertaken in the relatively recent past (Hagger, 2009, Chapter 
7), it is also important to protect the competent child’s right to decide about participating in 
research (Hagger and Woods, 2005,  Hagger ibid. and Cave, 2010).  Achieving the right 
balance between protection and empowerment is a difficult task for RECs who must approve 
proposals for clinical trials in conjunction with the Medicines and Healthcare Products 
Agency given the array of disparate ethical and legal guidance. The Regulations 2004 may be 
perceived as being particularly restrictive because of the requirement for consent only from a 
legal proxy with respect to children under 16 although the originating EU Directive is more 
ambiguous (Art. 4(a)). The position of the Regulations 2004 is at odds with developing case 
law which increasingly acknowledges children’s right to autonomy as provided by Article 
  
 
8(1) of the ECHR (Mabon 2005). It has been argued that the judiciary could develop this 
right further based on empirical evidence that shows that children are more capable of 
understanding the implications of what they are deciding than is traditionally understood 
(Hagger 2009, Chapter 2). This, and the fact that international trajectories of children’s rights 
seek to develop their autonomous interests (ibid) suggest to us that the Regulations should be 
amended to allow competent children the right to consent to research, not merely the right to 
assent as suggested by Cave (2010).  In practice and in accordance with ethical guidelines, a 
child’s assent may be sought where they have capacity as assessed by a broad range of factors 
(European Commission, 2008). In our view, this is the minimum that should be required 
rather than a mere consideration of the child’s wishes with regards to the research that is 
required once capacity-appropriate information has been provided.  
 
Whilst we would advocate the right of every child to participate in the decision-
making process, to receive appropriately designed information and to be respected in the light 
of their burgeoning autonomy, we also accept that parental authority will carry the greatest 
weight and the law does not require parents to involve their children in making decisions. In 
light of this, it is important to explore the role of TM and parental consent to paediatric 
research specifically. Before we do so, the ethical concerns about TM need to be examined in 
more detail as the law only provides a framework within which to view TM, and an 
incomplete and uncertain one at that. 
 
Does TM Matter? 
 
Recognition that TM is potentially at play in the research context serves as a warning that 
informed consent, designed to protect human participants in research, may not fulfil its 
  
 
intended object when it is in place merely as a bureaucratic function. This is because the 
bureaucratic procedure may be fulfilled without the person gaining consent employing 
measures to check understanding, explore possible misconceptions, and ensure all those 
involved, parents and child for example, have been involved in the process to an appropriate 
degree. The free and informed consent of the competent participant in clinical research, (or 
their parent/ legal representative in the case of children and incompetent adults), is not only a 
legal necessity as is described above but also a moral requisite. It is set out in many ethical 
codes such as the Nuremburg Code (Allied Control Council, 1949), the Declaration of 
Helsinki (WMA, 2008) and the Belmont Report (National Commission, 1976). The right to 
physical and mental integrity of the person under Article 3 of the European Union Charter of 
Fundamental Rights has particular relevance. It notes that, in the fields of medicine and 
biology, the free and informed consent of the person concerned must be respected (EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, 2000). The reasoning underpinning these codes has 
recognised the importance of respect for persons.  
 
The weaknesses of informed consent are well-documented (O’Neill, 2002 and Mason 
and O’Neill, 2007) , but a gross misconception about the main purpose of a study, its risks 
and benefits must be regarded as significant, since if consent has any value it is as an 
expression of respect for persons and is not merely a permissive nod. Whilst it may be true 
that the context of contemporary paediatric research is a long way from the atrocities of the 
infection studies conducted on children at Willowbrook (Edsall, 1971 and Goldby, 1971), this 
does not mean that we can afford to weaken contemporary ethical standards. Recent 
controversies show there is good reason to remain concerned about the potential harms which 
may arise in the research context.  We need regulation of paediatric research because 
unethical research has continued to be discovered. For example, in 2000, it was alleged that 
  
 
research was carried out on premature babies at North Staffordshire Hospitals without 
parental consent about a decade previously (Smith, 2000 and NHS Executive, 2003). 
Fortunately, now, controls are such that no REC would approve such trials in the UK thus 
effectively precluding them from taking place. Yet, ethical and legal principles have 
struggled to keep pace with scientific developments and this has been particularly evident 
where biotechnological advances are concerned (Buxton, 2007). 
 
The question as to whether the TM really matters might well be posed where 
participation in a scientifically sound study in which participants are not disadvantaged by 
their participation (Miller and Joffe, 2006). However, we suggest that TM does matter 
because having a well-designed and ethically robust study only speaks in favour of a 
researcher being justified in approaching a potential participant and not to enter participants 
irrespective of their understanding the study or not. What remains to be addressed in the 
recruitment process are some of the central ethical issues within medical research, what might 
be broadly called ‘respect for persons’ but taken to include a regard for the vulnerability of 
the participant and respect for their autonomy. Thus the responsibilities and duties of the 
researcher extend beyond the design and ethical justification of the research to the means by 
which respect for persons is best demonstrated. Where parental consent is required for a 
child’s participation in research, then respect for persons requires that the autonomy interests 
of the parents are respected alongside a balanced consideration of the child’s best interests 
and respect for their burgeoning autonomy.   
 
Following what has been described as the ‘strong model’ of informed consent 
(Meisel, Roth and Lidz, 1977), a researcher may fail in their duty of care when they do not 
attempt to provide  information appropriate to patient/parent‘s needs, in its substantive 
  
 
content or in its mode of delivery thus impeding the exercise of autonomy of the participant. 
Autonomy is also at stake when the participant lacks the competency to understand the 
necessary information about the study and the researcher may be regarded as culpable if they 
fail to properly assess the participant’s understanding.  Even if no harm comes to the 
participant in an otherwise scientifically robust and ethical study there is still reason to 
believe that the dignitary harm against the person is significant and ought to be avoided 
(Dresser, 2002, Appelbaum and Lidz, 2006).  Although the strong model has been criticised 
for taking a too rationalistic approach, Lidz (2006) argues that nevertheless it remains an 
important model of informed consent, a claim which seems to be borne out by the accounts of 
consent evident in UK law set out earlier.  
 
A second set of concerns revolve around broadly consequentialist considerations with 
an emphasis on the potential beneficial consequences of well designed and executed research.  
Several commentators have started to challenge the ‘disadvantage thesis’: the presumption 
that participation in a clinical trial necessarily disadvantages participants (Miller and Joffe, 
2006 and Saver, 2006). The implication of this approach is that it threatens a reversal of the 
traditional stance enshrined in the Declaration of Helsinki that the interests of the research 
subject are above all other the interests (WMA, 2008).  If it is often difficult to meet the 
‘informed’ standard of consent, then should consent be a lesser concern where there are other 
safeguards in place?  For example when a study is well designed and has been subject to 
rigorous peer review and ethical approval? There may be some support for this view in the 
light of the special procedure in place for recruiting into time critical or emergency research 
where a participant lacks capacity to consent and there is no time to consult others. However, 
the prospect of extending the approach adopted in emergency research to persons who have 
capacity would be disproportionate and wrong.  As Appelbaum and Lidz (2006) and others 
  
 
(Dresser 2002, Lidz 2006) have argued, although the concept of informed consent is 
problematic, the overriding concern in the research context should be the principle of respect 
for autonomy and the willing, informed participation of the recruited individual. These 
commentators argue that, whilst it may be a justifiable act of beneficence to restrict, or indeed 
circumvent autonomy when the restriction is to the direct benefit of that individual, this ought 
never to be the case in research where the participants' role in the research is to promote the 
interests of others, including the researcher and wider society. We concur with the view that 
this would constitute a form of wrongful instrumentalisation of the person.  As Appelbaum 
and Lidz (2006) argue, we should not be willing to accept a compromise when effective 
mechanisms for mitigating the problem may exist.  
 
So far we have indicated some of the broad problems associated with the TM but 
there is a further tier of complexity when it is a parent consenting for their child.  
 
TM and Parental Consent for Children 
 
Shilling and Young (2009) in a review of the literature dealing with parent’s experiences of 
providing consent to clinical trials identify a number of factors that influence the complexity 
of the consent process.  Parents are particularly vulnerable if the request to consent to 
research comes close to the diagnosis of a serious condition, or where the condition in 
question is acute and potentially life-threatening.  In comparison to parents of children with 
less serious chronic conditions, parents of more acutely ill children recognised that their 
decision-making ability was impaired, sometimes regretted their decision and sometimes 
failed to recognise the voluntary nature of research.  Shilling and Young also report several 
studies where, as a result of participating in randomised trials, parents felt disappointed, let 
  
 
down and even expressed concerns that their child had been discriminated against when they 
‘failed’ to be allocated to the experimental arm of the study, thus suggesting a lack of 
understanding about the nature of randomisation.  More relevant to this paper is their report 
of studies where parents of very sick neonates and children with cancer state a greater 
acceptance of risk in the hope of a cure.  In addition, several parents reported a feeling of 
pressure to participate in Phase I studies so as not to be seen as ‘giving up’ on their child. 
 
One must be cautious not to generalize these findings to all parents faced with the 
decision to put their child into a trial.  Research is beginning to uncover some of the 
significant cultural, social and economic factors which may indicate the important influences 
for certain groups of parents (Shilling and Young, 2009). Moreover, the situations in which 
parents have to make such decisions are not homogenous. Parents of children with 
neuromuscular disorders (NMD) are not in the same position as parents with very sick 
neonates or children with cancer. Thus more empirical work is needed to understand the 
significance of these different circumstances. As we have described elsewhere (Woods and 
McCormack, in press), NMDs are represented by quite powerful parent and patient 
organizations who actively lobby for research, generate funds to support research and 
establish research registries and bio-banks.  Involvement in parent/patient organizations 
comes with an expectation that research will happen and that members will put their children 
forward for inclusion.  It is in the context of working with such organizations that we have 
recognised many of the factors which may easily contribute to a form of the ‘collective 
therapeutic misconception’ described above. In a context in which there are currently no 
curative treatments for these conditions, it is very easy psychologically to render research as 
synonymous with treatment and for parent/patient activists to not only expect research to take 
place but to expect that they or their child should be included in such research (ibid.).  
  
 
Discussion 
 
Ethical guidance and legal directives share a consensus that consent to research ought to be 
given by a competent participant (or their proxy), be free and informed. However, despite the 
consensus on the principle, the challenge of determining when the ‘free’ and ‘informed’ 
conditions have in fact been met.  In theory, the formula for informed consent follows the 
form that certain things should be known and understood by the person consenting (the 
epistemic conditions), that they should be in a certain state with regard to their volition (the 
liberty conditions), and that they ought to be able to rationalise their decision by weighing the 
information about risks and benefits (the cognitive conditions).  The formula does not leave 
room for other factors such as the possible false or irrational beliefs held in parallel by the 
individual, or the role that hope may play in the interpretation of facts and reasons.  These 
other factors grow in significance when the person consenting is not the person who will be 
the bearer of the risk such as when parents are consenting for their child.  It is easy to 
empathise with the mother, who desperate to do everything possible for her gravely sick 
child, will externally conform to the model of informed consent whilst internally disregarding 
the niceties of trial design, and the theoretical risks, in order to get their child into a study 
conducted by a world leading researcher ( Henderson, 2008).  Could what we have described 
be justifiably regarded as an invalid consent if the mother is not in that particular state of 
grace in which she meets the epistemic, liberty and cognitive conditions?  This may be the 
case, even though the process may have met the legal and regulatory requirements in that the 
parent is seemingly free from external coercion and comprehensive information has been 
provided regarding the purpose and risks of the trial.  There is a real paradox here and not 
simply an academic point.  If a valid consent requires that the person consenting meets 
certain conditions, voluntariness and freedom from relevant constraints, appropriately 
  
 
informed, and able to use this information so as to weigh the risks and benefits of 
participation, then it matters that each component is satisfied to the relevant degree.  
 
As we have seen, the consent process must be adequate to the task of ensuring that 
these requirements are satisfied. Provided there is evidence that these issues have been 
explored and understood using best endeavours, there is likely to be legal compliance. To 
attempt an examination of a participant’s motives, or those of their proxy, could even be seen 
as overly paternalistic and intrusive. The law reflects the value placed on the ability to freely 
choose actions from options which are fully understood: to do so is to recognise the necessary 
freedom for an individual to ‘make her life her own’ (Harris 2003, p. 10), particularly with 
respect to medical decision-making (Re B 2002, para 20). To scrutinize personal reasons for 
decision-making could also be seen as an invasion of privacy and a potential breach of the 
right to private and family life under Article 8(1) of the European Convention on Human 
Rights enshrined in England in the Human Rights Act 1998. This Article has been interpreted 
broadly including ‘the physical and psychological integrity of a person’ (Pretty, 2002). 
  
The consent process must be adequate to two thresholds, it must enable the person 
consenting to consent or refuse to consent without prejudice and, it must also allow the 
researcher to exercise some judgment as to whether the conditions for a valid consent have 
been satisfied.  A researcher from within the TREAT-NMD consortium provided the 
following example.  The context was a phase I clinical trial of a novel ‘anti-sense’ drug with 
potential therapeutic use in DMD.  The study involved injection into a single muscle 
followed by a biopsy of the muscle after a period of time for the agent to have an effect.  
There was no possibility of direct benefit to the subject. However during the consent process 
the researcher asked the parents of the eligible child to repeat their understanding of the 
  
 
purpose of the trial.  In their response the parents insisted that the trial would help their child 
to walk again.  Eventually the researcher decided that the child should not be entered into the 
study because he judged that the parents were unable to give a valid consent (Anonymous 
personal communication, 2009). 
 
It may be unfortunate that these parents voiced with particular force what many others 
also express, namely the hope that their child will benefit.  It would be hasty to draw the 
conclusion from such examples that parents who express this kind of hope are likely to be 
rendered incompetent in such circumstances and therefore should not be judged unable to 
consent for their children.  The issue of hope and its relevance to consent was the focus of 
some eloquent discussion by parent delegates during a debate on TM held at an international 
conference hosted by TREAT-NMD in Brussels (2009). The question was put that if hope is 
seen as problematic in the research context then this would disqualify most parents from 
consenting for their children unless, per impossible, it was feasible to determine a threshold 
for hope that was compatible with a valid consent.  
 
Hope and Misconception 
 
In our work with researchers and patient organizations in which we have explored the 
challenge of consent and TM, it has become apparent that in discussing hope as a possible 
factor within TM there is the potential for parents to believe that they are being either denied 
hope or else denied the capacity to consent for their children. If true, both would seem wrong.  
Hope is a complex concept but there is a consensus that hope has a role in helping individuals 
to cope with existential challenges, including the ability of a parent to cope with their child’s 
life limiting disease (Samson et al, 2009).  Hope is a leitmotif in the discourse we have 
  
 
witnessed when parents and patients meet or communicate virtually through the various 
media supported by patient organizations.  Certainly there should be more empirical work 
conducted in order to understand the dynamics of hope and to examine whether the coping 
that hope engenders can be directly constructed through the support and information available 
to parents (ibid.).  Where hope seems problematic is when it takes the form of a kind of self-
deception, though we raise this point with a certain degree of caution.  We suspect that many 
parents go through a phase of hoping for a quick fix medical cure for their child’s condition. 
However, where this form of hope becomes the motive for entering their child into a study 
then it has the potential to feed a serious misconception.  As we have observed elsewhere 
(Woods and McCormack, in press)) this form of blind hope does motivate parents to take 
extraordinary measures in order to try and ensure a place for their child in a clinical trial.  We 
suggest that this form of blind hope, perhaps ‘blind optimism’ would be more accurate, ought 
to be distinguished from the form of hope that results in a disposition not to despair and thus 
acts as a means of coping. Horng and Grady (2003) capture this as a distinction between 
therapeutic misconception/mis-estimation which may distort capacity to consent and 
therapeutic optimism which is always tolerable because it does not compromise autonomy. 
 
The French existentialist philosopher Marcel (1995) gives an account of hope that is 
directly relevant to this context. Marcel draws a distinction between two realms: that of fear 
and desire on the one hand, and despair and hope on the other. Optimism he argues, belongs 
to the realm of fear and desire because it imagines and anticipates a beneficial outcome. 
Treanor describes the contrast: ‘[o]ptimism exists in the domain of fear and desire. However, 
the essence of hope is not ’to hope that X’, but merely ‘to hope…. The person who hopes 
does not accept the current situation as final; however, neither does she imagine or anticipate 
the circumstance that would deliver her from her plight, rather she merely hopes for 
  
 
deliverance. The more hope transcends any anticipation of the form that deliverance would 
take, the less it is open to the objection that, in many cases, the hoped-for deliverance does 
not take place. If I desire that my disease be cured by a given surgical procedure, it is very 
possible that my desire might be thwarted. However, if I simply maintain myself in hope, no 
specific event (or absence of event) need shake me from this hope. (2010, p. 14) 
 
This distinction has some resonance with the, albeit limited, empirical work 
conducted in this field.  Samson et al 2009 in their work with parents of children with DMD 
describe a shift in parental hope from the concrete and specific to a ‘spiritual and intangible 
form… an inner resource that can help sustain parents’ efforts in caring for their sick child’ 
(p. 112). Jansen (2006, 2011) also points to the possibility that ‘therapeutic optimism’ may 
not be incompatible with a valid informed consent to research. In raising concerns about the 
quality of parental consent for research we are concerned not to diminish the importance of 
this sustaining form of hope but rather to identify the potential that a blind optimism may 
have in contributing to an abiding and serious TM. 
 
Conclusion 
 
We believe that there is an important agenda for further empirical research into the role of 
TM in consenting to research with children. In particular, the relationship between hope and 
TM in the context of parental consent for research is likely to contribute to the quality of 
informed consent and reassure researchers, parents and regulators alike. There are also 
supplementary strategies which can be adopted now in order to improve the quality of 
informed consent to research. (Horng and Grady 2003, and Jansen, 2011).  A different 
attitude towards the relationship between research regulators, researchers and research 
  
 
participants needs to be fostered, one which seeks to diminish the power differences that 
continue to exist in the research context. We have argued elsewhere that a closer relationship 
between patients, patient organizations and researchers up-streaming the involvement of 
patients in the research design process is likely to lead to a better understanding of research 
by patients, and a greater understanding of the needs and interests of patients by researchers 
(Woods and McCormack in press). In the final analysis however, it is the researcher’s 
responsibility to ensure that adequate procedures for informed consent are in place and that 
these are satisfied through their best endeavours before a child or any other individual is 
entered into a clinical trial where such consent is required. To expect more is not only 
unrealistic but neither morally nor legally required; it may even risk an invasion of privacy of 
the individual consenting, a right that has been recognised as deserving the strongest legal 
protection.  
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